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Lucas O’Brien

STATE BALLOT INITIATIVES AND FEDERAL
PREEMPTION: HOW COLORADO VOTERS HAVE
CHANGED COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM IN
WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT
ABSTRACT
There exists a notion in the United States that the federal
government manages land while the states manage wildlife. While
it is true that the responsibilities of wildlife management have
traditionally been reserved to the states, in many instances the
federal government does have the authority to manage and
conserve wildlife. This overlapping jurisdiction most often leads
to the preemption of a state’s laws and the frustration of its wildlife
management goals.
In the 2020 election, Colorado voters narrowly passed
Proposition 114, which requires Colorado Parks and Wildlife to
reintroduce wolves to the state by the end of 2023. This marks the
first instance of voters requiring a wildlife agency to take such a
broad action regarding the management of a species. While this
fact may not have an impact on the exact plan that Colorado Parks
and Wildlife creates, it presents a novel opportunity for Colorado,
and any states that follow, to strengthen their authority over
resident wildlife. By undertaking this reintroduction effort with a
mandate from voters, Colorado may benefit from the heightened
deference that courts often give, or suggest giving, to state ballot
initiatives. Operating much like a presumption against
preemption, this heightened deference would serve to tilt the scales
in the states’ favor in the event of a conflict with federal authority.
This article explores how ballot initiatives present the opportunity
for states to claw back some authority over their wildlife that has
been eroded by courts over the last century, including introducing
the deferential framework under which courts should analyze
conflicts between federal authority and state ballot initiatives.
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INTRODUCTION
Paws on the ground by 2023. In the 2020 election Colorado voters passed
Proposition 114, which requires Colorado Parks and Wildlife (“CPW”) to
reintroduce wolves to the state by the end of 2023 and create a plan for the ongoing
management of the species. This is not the first time that voters have made their
voices heard in wildlife management via a state ballot initiative, but it is the first
instance voters have required a wildlife agency to take such sweeping action
regarding the management of a species.
Mandates like Proposition 114 present Colorado, and other states that enact
similar ballot initiatives, a novel opportunity to prevail in a conflict with federal law. 1
Over the past several decades, states have repeatedly had federal statutes and
objectives preempt their wildlife laws and frustrate their wildlife management
tactics. Decades of judicial precedent upholding and expanding federal authority in
this area has slowly eroded states’ ownership of wildlife. In other areas of the law,
courts have historically granted greater deference to state ballot initiatives than to
ordinary state laws when challenged by federal authority.
In United States wildlife management, there exists a longstanding notion
that the federal government manages land while the states manage wildlife. 2 It is true
that wildlife management has traditionally been reserved to the states, but federal
agencies also have the authority—and often an obligation—to manage and conserve
wildlife on federally owned lands. This overlapping jurisdiction often leads to the
preemption of state laws or objectives.
By undertaking this reintroduction effort with a mandate from voters,
Colorado should benefit from the heightened deference that courts give to state ballot
initiatives. Operating much like a presumption against preemption, this heightened
deference serves to tilt the scales in the states’ favor in the event of a conflict with
federal authority.
This article explores how ballot initiatives present the possibility for states
to claw back some authority over their wildlife that has slowly been eroded away by
courts over the last century. It begins with an introduction to state wildlife
management, including the most common problems that states face from the federal
government and a brief history of the ownership of wildlife. The article then
introduces the relevant sources of federal land and wildlife management authority.
Next, it discusses how state and federal authority generally work in tandem, but in
instances of conflict, state authority has been preempted. Then, the article presents
the deferential standard under which courts should analyze conflicts between federal
laws and state ballot initiatives. The article concludes by demonstrating why
Proposition 114, and state ballot initiatives in general, represent an opportunity for
states to regain some of the wildlife management authority that has been lost to the
federal government over the last century.

1. Whether it is prudent to allow citizens to make wildlife management decisions in place of, or in
addition to, state wildlife agencies is beyond the scope of this article.
2. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 534 (1976).
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CONFLICTS BETWEEN STATE WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT
AND FEDERAL AUTHORITIES

There is a commonly repeated wildlife management mantra that states
manage wildlife, and the federal government manages land. 3 With its origins tracing
back to ancient Roman law, this mantra has been reinforced by the longstanding
wildlife management system in the United States. 4 This divide in management
appears to be relatively straightforward. However, upon closer inspection, the divide
between state and federal authority is far from clear and the subject is rife with
conflict. In the western states, where the federal government owns 45% of the land, 5
these issues arise regularly.
A.

Sources of Conflict

The Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies (“AFWA”) represents state
fish and wildlife management agencies to the federal government with a goal of
advancing favorable fish and wildlife conservation policies. 6 In 2014, the AFWA
commissioned a task force (“Task Force”) to investigate how state wildlife agency
directors “perceive the relationship between state and federal agencies, by
determining the relationship’s implications on states’ authority to manage wildlife,
and by making recommendations to strengthen the relationship between state and
federal conservation agencies.” 7 The directors’ perceptions highlight the areas of
wildlife management where state and federal authority regularly conflict.
Additionally, the perceptions identify the federal laws that most often impede state
objectives. Understanding which federal statutes are most often at issue informs
whether and how ballot initiatives could be used by states to overcome these
impediments by helping lawmakers or those drafting ballot initiatives craft the laws
in such a way that best avoids preemption.
Of the thirty-seven states that participated in the Task Force’s survey,
responses suggest that federal interference is not uniform across the country. 8
Notably, nearly all directors from western states believed that their authority had
decreased relative to the federal government’s over the course of their careers. 9 To
identify the source of this shift in authority, the respondents were asked to identify
challenges and successes in regard to wildlife management and conservation acts,
regulations, or policies. 10

3. Id. at 534-35.
4. See infra Section II (discussing the origins of the state ownership doctrine and its importance to
wildlife management).
5. CAROL HARDY VINCENT ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW
AND DATA Summary (2020).
OF
FISH
&
WILDLIFE
AGENCIES,
6. Overview,
ASS’N
https://www.fishwildlife.org/landing/overview (last visited Mar. 19, 2021).
7. ASS’N OF FISH & WILDLIFE AGENCIES TASK FORCE ON STATES AUTH.’S, WILDLIFE
MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY: THE STATE AGENCIES’ PERSPECTIVE 2 (2014) [hereinafter AFWA
TASK FORCE].
8. Id. at 5.
9. Id. at 6.
10. Id.
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States primarily identified the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) as a legal
and regulatory challenge to states’ ability to manage their wildlife. 11 States pointed
to ambiguities in the listing and delisting process as the source of this challenge,
noting that federal agencies appear to give equal weight to public and state agency
input. 12 As an organization that promotes the use of science-based decision making,
it is no surprise why granting public input such deference would frustrate the AFWA
and its member states.
Another challenge that states identified were the restrictions that are often
imposed by federal agencies’ land management decisions. 13 The Task Force found
that many of the statutes that govern these decisions are written in a way that
“leave[s] room for loose interpretations of land management authority.” 14 The
ambiguities that this creates allows land managers too much latitude, often leading
them to implement preservationist interpretations of the statutes that are contrary to
the principles of state-level habitat management. 15 Additionally, “many of these land
management planning efforts . . . fail to consider the impact they have on state trust
species and state agencies’ ability to manage these species in accordance with their
public duties.” 16 For example, some federal agencies employ minimalist
management strategies to return the land to its natural condition, which necessarily
excludes the heavy-handed wildlife management tactics implemented by states. 17
Several other issues were identified as posing problems to states’
management authority. State agency directors described the National Forest
Management Act 18 as essentially halting the management of forests in many areas
due to the complex requirements of the act, such as the requirement to develop and
comply with comprehensive management plans for each forest unit. 19 States also
perceived that federal agencies often tailored their resource management plans for a
specific class of user, such as the timber industry, despite plans conflicting with a
state’s wildlife management objectives. 20 Some forest units were seemingly
managed for preservation rather than conservation, despite that being at odds with
the requirements of the National Forest Management Act. 21
The Wilderness Act, 22 one of the most wide-reaching preservationist
statutes, has strict exclusionary management practices that prevent states from taking
part in most management decisions. 23 This act states that designated land is owned
by the federal government and is to be managed by federal agencies for two
purposes: “to advance on-the ground benefits for a specific class of user, and to
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 8. The ESA will be discussed in further detail in Section III.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
16 U.S.C. § 1604.
Id. at 12; 16 U.S.C. § 1604.
AFWA TASK FORCE, supra note 7, at 12.
Id.
16 U.S.C. § 1131.
AFWA TASK FORCE, supra note 7, at 15-16.
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protect the indirect benefits enjoyed by a group of non-users.” 24 In the survey, states
noted a lack of recognition by federal agencies for states’ management authority over
wildlife in wilderness areas, reducing the state’s ability to manage the populations
that reside there. 25 Several states cited instances of federal managers making
unilateral access decisions, closing these areas to hunting and fishing, and
disregarding state regulations. 26
B.

Specific Instances of Conflict

Land and wildlife management disputes happen frequently between state
and federal agencies, often ending up in court. A few notable examples are the Forest
Service killing deer in a National Forest in disregard of state game laws, 27 the Fish
and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) refusing to allow the state of Wyoming to vaccinate
elk on the National Elk Refuge, 28 and the state of New Mexico violating a federal
statute prohibiting states from killing, capturing, or otherwise managing wild horses
and burros on public lands. 29 Many of these disputes have become foundational cases
for the study of the federal government’s authority over public lands and resources. 30
Not all instances of conflict result in judicial resolution. The conflicts
included in the AFWA’s Task Force Report likely went unchallenged because states
are often powerless to challenge the federal action. 31 The wolf reintroduction in
Idaho serves as an example. In 1995, most of the Idaho’s residents were against the
already ongoing wolf reintroduction. 32 The opposition from the state was so fierce
that the Idaho State Legislature passed a bill that prohibited the Idaho Department of
Fish and Game from assisting with wolf reintroduction in any way. 33 Disregarding
the position of the state, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service released additional
wolves on national forest lands within the state. 34 Once the wolves were in the state,
the Idaho Department of Fish and Game was forced to account for them in all other
aspects of wildlife management. For example, the Idaho Department of Fish and
Game had to monitor wolves’ effect on popular game species like sheep and elk,
which are also wolves’ primary food source. 35
These examples serve to demonstrate the realities of wildlife management
in the United States and the issues that states regularly face. The simple mantra that
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 16; 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (2021).
AFWA TASK FORCE, supra note 7, at 16.
Id.
Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96, 100 (1928).
Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1222 (10th Cir. 2002).
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 531–33 (1976).
See, e.g., Kleppe, 426 U.S. 529; see Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); see Wyoming, 279
F.3d 1214.
See Steve Stuebner, Wolf Reintroduction in Idaho (1995-2011), LIFE ON THE RANGE (last visited
Mar. 19, 2021), https://idrange.org/range-stories/north-idaho/wolf-reintroduction-in-idaho/
(discussing the state of Idaho’s inability to prevent the federal government’s reintroduction of
wolves on federal land within the state).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. (discussing Idaho Department of Fish and Game’s method of managing wolves as a big
game species and residents’ concern that wolves would “decimate” sheep and elk populations).
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states manage wildlife while the federal government manages land brushes over
these conflicts and ignores the complexities of the actual management system.
II.

STATE MANAGEMENT OF WILDLIFE IN THE UNITED
STATES

This section provides a history and overview of states’ authority to manage
wildlife. It traces the origins of the state ownership doctrine and analyzes how it has
been interpreted by courts and implemented in modern wildlife management laws
and policies.
A.

History of Wildlife Ownership

In the United States, the state ownership doctrine generally governs the
control of wildlife. The doctrine provides that state governments have authority to
manage and control all wild animals within their jurisdiction. 36 While a state’s
authority has some limitations from the federal government, the doctrine is
foundational to the United States’ system of wildlife management.
The doctrine’s roots trace back to ancient Roman law where wild animals
were viewed as belonging to the community until captured. 37 As these principles
transformed into English common law, severe restrictions and control were added
that granted the government vast authority to limit the taking of wild animals. 38 In
essence, English subjects were only allowed to harvest wildlife if they had
permission from the king. 39 As colonists declared their independence from England,
it was readily apparent that the rugged and wild landscape of America was
incompatible with the English laws. 40
In the early days of America, the federal government abandoned the strict
limitations on capturing wild animals and implemented principles of capture that
resembled ancient Rome. 41 The ability to hunt was expanded to common people
while limited government oversight allowed for the essentially free taking of the wild
animals that inhabited this new land. 42 The abundance of wildlife created the
perception of an inexhaustible resource. 43 However, it was also during this era that
the first game laws were introduced. 44

36. David Favre, American Wildlife Law – An Introduction, MICH. STAT UNIV., ANIMAL LEGAL &
HISTORICAL CENTER (2003), https://www.animallaw.info/article/american-wildlife-lawintroduction.
37. Id. at Section 1.
38. Id.
39. Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulson, The Public Trust in Wildlife, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1437,
1453 (2013).
40. Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust: The American Rule
of Capture and State Ownership of Wildlife, 35 ENVT’L L. REV. 673, 685 (2005).
41. Id. at 677–788, 684 (the rule of capture that was welcomed into the American colonies originated
in Roman law).
42. Devin Kenney, A Goat Too Far?: State Authority to Translocate Species On and Off (and
Around) Federal Land, 8 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RES. L. 303, 311 (2015).
43. Id.
44. DEAN LUECK, AN ECONOMIC GUIDE TO STATE WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT 2 (2000).
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The primary goal of these laws was to protect valuable species from
overharvest. 45 These restrictions typically came in the form of a hunting season and
bag limits, which set a daily or seasonal quota on the number of animals that could
be taken. 46 By the end of the colonial period, every colony except Georgia had closed
seasons for deer. 47 However, west of the Mississippi there were no game laws in any
state until 1851. 48 Early pioneers viewed any law restricting the harvest of such
resources as wasteful because America was rich with wildlife. 49
During the early nineteenth century, this view of animals as inexhaustible
combined with a decentralized management authority led to the overharvest of many
species, particularly those in states slow to adopt game laws. 50 This reduced many
species’ populations to below sustainable levels; some species were fully wiped
out. 51 It was not until late in the nineteenth century that public recognition of the
decline of wildlife reached a level that would spark the first conservation
movement. 52 By the 1880s, all of the 48 continental states or respective territories
had approved game legislation similar to that of the colonies. 53
Before any American courts dealt with issues relating to wildlife ownership,
they spent the nineteenth century developing the public trust doctrine—the notion
that states have ownership over common property to be held, protected, and regulated
for common use and benefit of all. 54 Implied within state’s ownership and control
over common property was the ownership and control over wildlife. 55
The first time the Supreme Court fully articulated the concept of states
ownership of wildlife was in 1896 in Geer v. Connecticut. 56 At issue before the Court
was whether the state of Connecticut could make possession of a harvested game
species legal within their borders, but transportation of a harvested game species
illegal. 57 The Court affirmed Connecticut’s right to regulate game in this manner. 58
The Court relied on both history and modern precedent in its reasoning. The
Court delved into the origins of “the right to reduce animals ferae naturae to
possession,” concluding that the right had always “been subject to the control of the
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

57.
58.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Blumm, supra note 40, at 687.
Kenney, supra note 42, at 311-12.
Blumm, supra note 40, at 690-91; Blumm, supra note 39, at 1456; Kenney, supra note 41, at
311-12.
Kenney, supra note 42, at 312.
LUECK, supra note 44, at 2.
Blumm, supra note 39, at 1458.
Id.
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma (1979). The Court
first dealt with the issue of state ownership of wildlife in 1876 in McCready v. Virginia. 94 U.S.
391 (1876). However, that case merely “acknowledged the ability of a state to limit access to
oysters found within state waters.” Favre, supra note 36, at Introduction. It was not until 1896 in
Geer that the Court gave “the full articulation of the doctrine, along with a detailed historical
analysis of the concept.” Id.
Geer, 161 U.S. at 522.
Id. at 528-29.
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law-giving power.” 59 History instructed that while there was no restriction on “the
power of the individual to reduce game, of which he was the owner in common with
other citizens, to possession,” state ownership of land vested an “authority to control
the taking and use of that which belonged to no one in particular, but was common
to all.” 60
The Court highlighted that regulatory authority emanating from land
ownership can be traced from ancient Rome through the legislation of Charlemagne,
the Napoleon Code, and into the common law of “all the countries of Europe” and
to England. 61 The Court recognized that “this attribute of government to control the
taking of animals ferae naturae . . . was vested in the colonial governments . . . [and
was] passed to the states with the separation from the mother country, and remains
in them at the present day.” 62
The Court continued its reasoning with modern sources of authority. The
Court stated it had “been referred to no case where [the state’s] power to so legislate
has been questioned,” and cited “numerous” examples of “cases recognizing the right
of the states to control and regulate the common property in game”, including two
Supreme Court cases involving state management of fish within state boundaries. 63
Adopting language from the supreme court of Minnesota, the Court concluded that
“the ownership of wild animals, so far as they are capable of ownership, is in the
state, not as a proprietor, but in its sovereign capacity, as the representative and for
the benefit of all its people in common.” 64 While Geer was ultimately overturned in
1978 by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 65 the Court was clear that Hughes did nothing to
change the public trust ownership of wildlife. 66 States continue to use Geer to support
the state regulation of wildlife 67 and 48 states explicitly claim ownership of
wildlife. 68
B.

The Tenth Amendment

States have attempted to claim jurisdiction over wildlife based on the
authority of the Tenth Amendment. The Amendment provides: “[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” 69 While it appears to vest
states with a certain degree of authority, the Tenth Amendment is often viewed as a
paper tiger. In United States v. Darby, the Court declared “[t]he [A]mendment states
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 522.
Id. at 523.
Id. at 523-26.
Id. at 527-28.
Id. at 528 (citing McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876) (upholding the authority of the state
of Virginia to regulate the taking of oysters from state waters), Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139
U.S. 240 (1891) (upholding the authority of the state of Massachusetts to regulate the catching of
fish within state waters)).
Id. at 529 (quoting State v. Rodman, 59 N.W. 1098 (Minn. 1894)).
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979).
Id. at 338-39; Blumm, supra note 39, at 1461.
Blumm, supra note 39, at 1461.
Blumm, supra note 39, at 1462 n.204.
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered. There is nothing in
the history of its adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the
relationship between the national and state governments.” 70
Little judicial discussion took place around the Tenth Amendment’s role in
wildlife management until 1920 when the Supreme Court considered a challenge to
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act in Missouri v. Holland. 71 There, the Court rejected
any contention that the Tenth Amendment could stand as an impediment to federal
enforcement of a lawful act arising under another enumerated power. 72 The next time
the courts took up the Tenth Amendment’s role in wildlife management was in 1979
in Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources. 73
In Palila, the Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources was
responsible for maintaining a herd of feral sheep and goats for sport-hunting on state
lands. 74 These herds were modifying and destroying the designated critical habitat
of the Palila bird, a species listed under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). 75
Pursuant to the ESA, the federal government established a recovery team to devise a
plan to save the bird from extinction, which ultimately would have included
eradicating the sheep and goats. 76 Hawaii argued that under the Tenth Amendment
the state retained exclusive sovereignty over the issue because this was taking place
entirely on state land. 77 Even when no federal land was at issue, the Court was not
swayed, concluding that the Tenth Amendment does nothing to constrain federal
enforcement of the ESA. 78
There have been several other cases that ended in similar fashion. In Gibbs
v. Babbit, the Fourth Circuit concluded that while “[s]tates have important interests
in regulating wildlife and natural resources within their borders,” it may not be
exercised “in derogation of an enumerated federal power.” 79 In a more searing blow
to state’s authority for managing wildlife, the Tenth Circuit in Wyoming v. United
States, stated that state’s authority over wildlife is not constitutionally derived and
that it was “painfully apparent that the Tenth Amendment does not reserve to the
State of Wyoming the right to manage wildlife . . . , regardless of the
circumstances.” 80 In sum, while courts often acknowledge states’ jurisdiction over,
and longstanding role in, managing wildlife within their borders, the Tenth
Amendment fails to provide constitutional support for that authority.

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
Id. at 435.
471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979), aff’d on other grounds, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981), aff’d 852
F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 989.
Id. at 988-90.
Id. at 988.
Id. at 992.
Id. at 995.
Gibbs v. Babbit, 214 F.3d 483, 499 (4th Cir. 2000).
Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1227 (10th Cir. 2002).
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How States Manage Wildlife Today

In accordance with their public trust obligations discussed above, states
remain responsible for managing the species that reside within their respective
borders. 81 Each state has its own agency dedicated to this task. 82 These agencies were
built off the management foundations put in place by hunting laws established during
colonial times, such as those protecting valuable species like deer from overharvest
or encouraging the harvest of “undesirable” species like wolves and other
predators. 83
During the late nineteenth and into the twentieth century, states
implemented policies, that are mostly still enforced, to protect species that had been
overharvested or unprotected during the period of unregulated taking. 84 These
policies now form the basis of how states manage wildlife. 85 In general, states have
taken similar approaches by creating agencies dedicated to managing wildlife,
setting seasonal closures to limit access to wildlife, setting daily and seasonal quotas,
administering licenses for taking species, limiting methods of taking species,
enforcing these laws, hiring biologists to research the state’s populations, creating
and managing systems of wildlife refuges for struggling populations, protecting nongame and endangered species, and creating educational programs about wildlife. 86
III.

FEDERAL LAND AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
AUTHORITY

The other prong of the wildlife management system is the management of
federally owned lands. The federal government is largely responsible for stewardship
of land and habitat across the Western United States. About 45% of the total land in
the western states 87 is owned by the federal government. 88 In these states, federal
land ownership leaves states with minimal autonomy to make meaningful land
management decisions. This section provides an overview of the sources of federal
authority and how the major federal landowning agencies—the Forest Service and
the Bureau of Land Management—exercise that authority.
A.

The Property Clause

In the realm of land and resource management, the Property Clause is one
of the key provisions of the Constitution’s grant of authority to the federal
government. As the cases discussed below demonstrate, the Property Clause is often
the source of federal authority in major wildlife management disputes that end up in
the courts. The clause gives Congress the “Power to dispose of and make all needful
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

LUECK, supra note 44, at 1.
See id. at 3-4, 6 (introducing modern state game commissions and wildlife agencies).
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Generally considered to include California, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, Arizona, New Mexico,
Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, and Utah. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra
note 5, 4 n.16.
88. Id. at 19.
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Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States.” 89 The Supreme Court has never “definitely settled” the full scope of
the Property Clause, but it has concluded that “at least[] it is a grant of power to the
United States of control over its property.” 90 In the twentieth century, the Supreme
Court repeatedly affirmed and expanded the power granted to federal land
management agencies through the Property Clause.
Several of these decisions dealt with federal actions that took place on
federal land and directly contravened existing state laws. In Hunt v. United States,
the Court held that it was lawful for Forest Service agents to kill “overbrowsing”
deer in a national forest despite the action violating state game laws that restricted
the number of deer that could be killed each year. 91 The Court determined that the
Secretary of Agriculture and his respective agents were attempting to protect the
lands of the United States, an action that is squarely within the bounds of the
authority conferred by the Property Clause. 92 Furthermore, the Court concluded that
“the power of the United States to thus protect its land and property does not admit
of doubt . . . the game laws or any other statute of the state to the contrary
notwithstanding.” 93
Years later, the Court took Hunt’s reasoning and expanded it significantly
in Kleppe v. New Mexico. 94 At issue in Kleppe was the legality of the Wild FreeRoaming Horses and Burros Act, which protects wild horses and burros from
capture, harassment, and death. 95 The Act prevented New Mexico agencies from
capturing stray burros pursuant to state law. 96 New Mexico claimed that the BLM
lacked authority to enforce the Act against state agencies because the burros were
neither a part of interstate commerce nor damaging public land. 97 The issue turned
to the extent of the authority granted under the Property Clause—whether Congress’s
decision to protect these animals “can be sustained as a ‘needful’ regulation
‘respecting’ the public lands.” 98
Citing to Hunt for its authority, New Mexico claimed that “the Property
Clause gives Congress only the limited power to regulate wild animals in order to
protect the public lands from damage.” 99 The Court rejected that narrow reading and
went on to expand its holding from Hunt, stating that while “damage to the land is a
sufficient basis for regulation [under the Property Clause]; [Hunt] contains no
suggestion that it is a necessary one.” 100 The Court ultimately upheld the Wild FreeRoaming Horses and Burros Act on the authority of the Property Clause, holding

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 89 (1907).
278 U.S. 96, 100 (1928).
Id.
Id.
426 U.S. 529, 546 (1976).
Id.; 16 U.S.C. § 1331.
Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 546.
Id. at 533.
Id. at 536.
Id. at 537.
Id. (Emphasis added).
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“that the Property Clause . . . gives Congress the power to protect wildlife on the
public lands, state law notwithstanding.” 101
The courts have even interpreted the Property Clause to permit federal
regulation of activities on non-federal land, provided that it is necessary to protect
federal lands and resources. 102 In one early instance from 1897, Camfield v. United
States, the Court held it was unlawful for a landowner to construct a fence on his
private property that prevented access to 20,000 acres of public lands. 103 At issue in
the case was the interpretation and application of the Unlawful Enclosure Act of
1885, which declares it unlawful for any person to enclose any public lands without
claim or title to them. 104 Under the power of the Property Clause, the federal
government could regulate the landowner’s actions on private property because they
severely impacted federal lands. 105 Following Camfield, courts have routinely
concluded that the federal government can control activities on state or private land
that might affect federal property. 106
Although the federal government’s power under the Property Clause
appears limitless, there are some restrictions. Foremost are limitations from the text
of the clause itself. The clause grants the government the authority to make “all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting . . . Property belonging to the United
States.” 107 From that text, a court could find four limitations: 1) the issue must be
about a rule or regulation; 2) the rule or regulation must involve property belonging
to the United States; 3) the rule or regulation must be needful; 4) and the rule or
regulation must be one respecting federal property.
Though courts have been hesitant to place restrictions on the Property
Clause, the existence of these facial limitations suggests that there are weaknesses in
the authority granted by the clause. Identifying and understanding these weaknesses
provides an opportunity for states to draft laws or ballot initiatives in a way that
minimizes conflict or ensures that where conflict does occur, the state can use these
limitations to its favor.
B.

The Treaty Clause

Another source of federal authority in wildlife management is the Treaty
Clause. This Clause provides that “[The President] shall have the Power . . . to make
Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.” 108 The United States
has entered into several treaties over the past century that recognize the international
importance of wildlife conservation. 109 For example, the Pacific Salmon Treaty

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
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Id. at 546.
See Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 525 (1897).
Id. at 521.
Id.
Martin Nie et al., Fish and Wildlife Management on Federal Lands: Debunking State Supremacy,
47 ENVT’L L. 797, 824 n. 164 (2017).
107. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl 2.
108. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl 2.
109. Nie, supra note 106, at 826.
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between the United States and Canada, 110 the International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling, 111 and the Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears. 112
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 (“MBTA”), 113 which is between the United
States and several countries to protect migratory birds and birds in danger of
extinction, has had the largest impact in domestic wildlife management.
The MBTA, which imposes strict prohibitions on the taking, hunting, and
killing of certain birds, is considered to be one of the “origins of modern federal
wildlife law.” 114 States immediately challenged its constitutionality. 115 One
challenge came from the state of Missouri which sought to enjoin a federal game
warden from enforcing the MBTA. 116 The dispute rose to the Supreme Court in
Missouri v. Holland, which upheld the validity of the treaty. The Court held that the
Treaty Clause provided the requisite authority for the federal regulation of these
species despite the state’s claim of interest in managing its wildlife. 117 The Court
reasoned that unlike other wildlife, “the subject matter [i.e., migratory birds] is only
transitorily within the State and has no permanent habitat therein.” 118 Therefore, the
Court concluded that federal regulation of migratory birds was proper because the
birds are “a national interest” that “can be protected only by national action.” 119
Species covered by international treaties often move across state and
international borders. Therefore, just as the Court concluded in Holland, so long as
a treaty is a valid exercise of Congress’s power, the federal government will have
authority over these species and federal law would preempt any conflicting state law.
C.

The Commerce Clause

The Commerce Clause, which gives Congress the power “to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states,” 120 was not invoked
as support for federal control of wildlife in early cases, such as Geer in 1896. 121 The
Court in Geer, which was considering the legality of transporting harvested game,
did not even consider wildlife as an interstate issue. 122 As the use of the Commerce

110. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Canada Concerning Pacific Salmon, Can.U.S., Jan. 28, 1985, T.I.A.S. No. 11091.
111. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S.
No. 1849.
112. Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, Nov. 15, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 3918.
113. 16 U.S.C. § 703.
114. Nie, supra note 106, at 827.
115. Id.
116. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 430-431 (1920).
117. Id. at 435.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
121. Nie, supra note 106, at 833.
122. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 530-31 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma (1979).
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Clause power grew throughout the first half of the twentieth century, 123 it would not
long before courts expanded it to wildlife management cases. 124
In 1979, the Court expressly overruled Geer in the case Hughes v.
Oklahoma, which brought wildlife to equal footing with other natural resources
under the Commerce Clause. 125 At issue in Hughes was the legality of a state law
that prohibited the interstate sale or transportation of minnows that were procured in
Oklahoma. 126 Because this law facially discriminated against interstate commerce
and “overtly block[ed] the flow of interstate commerce at [the] State’s borders,” the
Court held it was “repugnant to the Commerce Clause” despite Oklahoma’s claim to
exclusive control over its wildlife. 127
The Court pronounced that the “ownership language” of prior cases like
Geer “must be understood as no more than a 19th-century legal fiction expressing
the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the
exploitation of an important resource.” 128 Quoting itself from Douglas v. Seacoast,
a case from two years prior, the Hughes Court stated “[n]either the States nor the
Federal Government, any more than a hopeful fisherman or hunter, has title to these
creatures until they are reduced to possession by skillful capture.” 129 The Court
concluded that “challenges under the Commerce Clause to state regulations of wild
animals should be considered according to the same general rule applied to state
regulations of other natural resources.” 130 This represented a major shift in the
Court’s understanding of wildlife management and ownership. Following Hughes,
the regulation of wildlife was squarely within Congress’s Commerce Clause
authority and would be treated the same as any other resource.
Despite more recent cases like United States v. Lopez 131 and United States
v. Morrison 132 limiting Congress’s use of the Commerce Clause in other areas, the
strength of Hughes and other Commerce Clause related wildlife precedent remained
unaffected. 133 In Gibbs v. Babbit, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had no
trouble finding Commerce Clause authority for federal regulation of state wildlife. 134
The Gibbs court analyzed the relationship between the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
123. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding the Commerce Clause Power over wheat
grown for home consumption because of the aggregated effects on wheat sold in interstate
commerce).
124. See Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977) (stating that “there can be no
question” that Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the taking of fish
in state waters); Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371 (1978) (stating that
Montana’s regulation of wildlife cannot impede interstate commerce).
125. 441 U.S. 322, 324-326 (1979).
126. Id. at 322-23.
127. Id. at 337.
128. Id. at 334 (internal quotations omitted).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 335.
131. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (federal Gun-Free School Zones Act struck down).
132. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (provision of Violence against Women Act struct
down).
133. Nie, supra note 106, at 835; See e.g., Gibbs v. Babbit, 214 F.3d 483, 486-87 (4th Cir. 2000);
Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
134. 214 F.3d 483, 487 (4th Cir. 2000).
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Service’s removal of red wolves from North Carolina and the effects on interstate
commerce under the test framework articulated in Lopez. 135 Under this test, Congress
has the authority to regulate either “channels of interstate commerce . . .
instrumentalities of interstate commerce . . . [or] activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce.” 136 The court reasoned that “[t]he relationship between red
wolf takings and interstate commerce is quite direct—with no red wolves, there will
be no red wolf related tourism, no scientific research, and no commercial trade in
pelts.” 137 Therefore, the court concluded that the removal of red wolves
“substantially affects interstate commerce.” 138 This conclusion informs the modern
understanding of the Commerce Clause’s authority in wildlife management.
D.

Statutory Authority

Federal land and wildlife management authority is generally exercised
through statutes that govern how federal agencies manage federally owned land and
resources. Several of these statutes significantly curtail states’ ability to manage
wildlife on federal land, or in some cases, even their ability to manage wildlife on
state land. The most powerful statute is the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). Passed
in 1973, the ESA establishes an affirmative obligation for the federal government to
use “all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any [listed] species to
the point at which the measures provided in [the Act] are no longer necessary.” 139
In order to be listed under the ESA, species must fit the statute’s criteria for
being either “threatened” or “endangered.” 140 Importantly, either the Secretary of the
Interior or the Secretary of Commerce must make the listing decision “solely on the
basis of the best scientific and commercial data available.” 141 Once a species is listed,
all federal agencies have an affirmative duty to ensure that agency action will not
jeopardize the wellbeing of the species. 142
However, the ESA duties are not limited to just federal actors. The ESA
bans the “take” of any listed species by all persons, 143 where “take” is defined as “to
harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect.” 144 Courts
have interpreted the ESA’s protections broadly, finding that the statute has
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137.
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Id. at 491.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 492.
Id. at 487.
16 U.S.C. § 1532(3).
16 U.S.C. § 1533.
16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A). See generally Erin H. Ward, Cong. Rsch. Serv., IF11241, The Legal
Framework of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) (2019) (stating that the Department of the
Interior has authority over terrestrial, freshwater, and catadromous species, which provides the
Secretary of the Interior the authority to make listing decisions for those species, while the
National Marine Fisheries Service within the Department of Commerce manages marine species
and anadromous fish, which provides the Secretary of Commerce the authority to make listing
decisions for those species).
142. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a).
143. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a).
144. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
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substantial “teeth.” 145 In the landmark ESA case Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,
the Supreme Court halted the completion of a nearly-finished, multi-million dollar
dam because it would destroy the critical habitat of a small, endangered fish. 146 The
Court made it expressly clear that the ESA mandates conservation of a species above
all else—including state management decisions. 147
Section 6 of the ESA provides that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(“FWS”) “shall cooperate to the maximum extent practicable with the States.” 148
This was added as a recognition of states’ expertise when it comes to its wildlife, and
required FWS to solicit input from the states when preparing final rules affecting a
listed species or when designating critical habitat. 149 States are permitted to assist
FWS in carrying out the goals of the ESA but are strictly forbidden from taking any
measures that directly or indirectly take a listed species. 150 While Section 6 may
appear to save some management authority for states, any inconsistent or less
restrictive state law will likely be preempted by the ESA. 151
Although the gray wolf is no longer a federally protected species, the
decision to delist it is already being challenged in federal court by advocacy
groups. 152 There is some concern that Colorado could create and implement a plan
based on this new status as a delisted species only to have the government reverse
course, relist the wolf, and strip the state of its management authority. 153 However,
that scenario is speculative and does not impact the potential implications of state
ballot initiatives in wildlife management in general.
IV.

PREEMPTION AND COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM

While the states and federal government have vastly different sources of
power and authority for natural resource management, the two levels of government
are generally meant to work in tandem to achieve their management objectives.
However, despite Congress making its intention for such cooperation clear, courts
have been reluctant to give this cooperative framework much weight in instances of
conflict. This section explains why, when conflicts arise, states rarely prevail.

145. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F.Supp 167, 169-70 (D.C.C. 1977); Tennessee Valley
Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S 153, 173 (1978); Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy District v. Watt, 549
F.Supp 704, 710 (D. Nev. 1982) aff’d sub nom., Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v.
Clark, 741 F.2d 257, 262 (9th Cir. 1984).
146. 437 U.S. at 184.
147. Id.
148. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(a).
149. Nie, supra note 106, at 847.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 848.
152. Matthew Brown, Groups ask court to restore protections for US gray wolves, AP NEWS (Jan. 14,
2021),
https://apnews.com/article/billings-lawsuits-wildlife-wolves-courtscf76716ad6bf7f169300dfc7471ca081.
153. James Anderson, Colorado begins wolf reintroduction plans OK’d by voters, AP NEWS (Jan. 14,
2021),
https://apnews.com/article/wildlife-colorado-denver-wolvesaeec087e3273a7b94816a84ebd045771.
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Federal Preemption

The doctrine of federal preemption, which originates from the Supremacy
Clause, governs the relationship between conflicting state and federal laws. The
Supremacy Clause states that the Constitution and valid federal laws “shall be the
supreme law of the land.” 154 Extending from this authority is the doctrine of federal
preemption, which provides that where state law and federal law conflict, state law
must always yield. 155
Federal preemption of state laws can be either expressly stated or implied,
with the implied preemption encompassing both field preemption and conflict
preemption. An example of express preemption in the wildlife context is the Marine
Mammal Protection Act, which states, in part, “No State may enforce . . . any State
law or regulation related to the taking of any species . . . of marine mammal.” 156
Alternatively, state laws can be implicitly preempted by field preemption
or conflict preemption. Field preemption occurs where “[t]he scheme of federal
regulation [is] so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no
room for the States to supplement it.” 157 However, federal land or wildlife related
laws generally contain a saving clause that reserves a degree of authority to states
and signals Congress’s desire for cooperation between a state and the federal
government. 158 Because of this, both express preemption and field preemption are
rare.
The alternative form of implied preemption, called conflict preemption,
comes when “it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law . . . or where
the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purpose and
objectives of Congress.” 159 Many of the previously discussed cases were issues of
conflict preemption. For example, the state game laws at issue in Hunt that would
have prevented the Forest Service from killing deer stood as an impediment to the
accomplishment of the objectives of Congress—namely the protection of federally
owned lands. 160
B.

Saving Clauses and Cooperative Federalism

By tempering federal authority with a saving clause, Congress intends for
state and federal governments to cooperate. The language of saving clauses often
reads like the one from Section 6 of the ESA discussed above, stating that the
relevant federal agency “shall cooperate to the maximum extent practicable with the
States.” 161 This cooperation, referred to as cooperative federalism, defines a
significant portion of environmental law. 162 If plotted on a spectrum with complete
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federal authority on one end and complete state authority on the other, most
environmental and resource issues fall into the middle, where both governments play
a role. 163 Despite saving clauses seeming to demonstrate Congress’s desire for
cooperation, the Supreme Court’s preemption decisions have failed to follow a
predictable analytical pattern, with its interpretations of saving clauses varying
wildly. 164 However, when conflicts arise, courts are less likely to grant deference to
the state’s role.
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Wyoming v. United States is illustrative
here. 165 In that case, the court was called upon to determine whether the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service could refuse to implement Wyoming’s plan to vaccinate the elk
living in the National Elk Refuge against brucellosis, a disease endemic to freeranging elk but novel to Wyoming’s domestic cattle. 166 The U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service and the state of Wyoming disagreed about the safety and efficacy of the
brucellosis vaccine when used in elk. 167 Ultimately, relying upon its interpretation of
the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997 (“NWRSIA”), the
Court found that where state and federal authorities directly conflict, state authority
is preempted. 168
In making that determination, the court looked to NWRSIA’s saving
clause. 169 The court ruled against Wyoming on the elk vaccination issue but
acknowledged that “[the saving clause] convinces us that Congress did not intend to
displace entirely state regulation and management of wildlife on federal public
lands. . . . [i]n other words, Congress rejected complete preemption of state wildlife
regulation within the [National Wildlife Refuge System].” 170 The court found the
text and legislative history confirmed that the FWS was only required to conform
with state objectives “to the extent practical.” 171 By finding that Congress did not
intend for states to be completely preempted, the court left open future opportunities
for saving clauses to retain more power to the states or for other factors—like voter
mandates—to influence this balance of power.
Although states have historical authority to manage wildlife within their
borders, that authority is neither dominant nor constitutionally derived. The federal
government is granted vast constitutional authority that can preempt incompatible
state action. As wildlife law developed over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
courts repeatedly sided with the federal government, expanding their power, and
giving little value to the guarantees of the Tenth Amendment. However, state ballot
initiatives provide a novel factor for courts to consider when determining the amount
of deference state wildlife management should receive.
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STATE BALLOT INITIATIVES AND THE DEFERENTIAL
STANDARD

This section introduces the basis for the deferential framework that courts
should apply to state ballot initiatives. It then goes on to discuss the implications of
that framework if applied to conflicts in wildlife management.
A.

The Presumption Against Preemption

Courts initially implemented what was essentially automatic preemption to
state-federal conflicts, however the Supreme Court pulled back from this formula in
the 1930s. 172 In the 1933 case Mintz v. Baldwin, a cattle business contended that a
state’s requirement to certify a herd against diseases was preempted by federal acts
addressing contagious diseases in cattle. 173 The Supreme Court, dismissing the cattle
business’s arguments, held that Congress had not explicitly expressed an intent to
preempt a state’s additional regulation. 174 Thus, Mintz shifted the implied
preemption analysis from automatic preemption to the current model that relies on
congressional intent. This change in analysis represented a shift in power towards
the states. The Mintz Court stated that the intent “to supersede or exclude state
action . . . is not lightly to be inferred.” 175 Thus, the concept known as the
presumption against preemption was born.
The Court has generally limited the presumption against preemption to
areas involving matters of “intimate concern” to the states—typically matters
traditionally left to the states. 176 For example, the presumption against preemption
has been applied in the context of health and safety, with courts reasoning that “[t]he
regulation of health and safety matters is primarily and historically a matter of local
concern.” 177
Conversely, the presumption has not been applied in areas where the
Constitution granted vast authority to the federal government. 178 For example, in
Hines v. Davidowitz, the Court struck down a Pennsylvania law that imposed
registration requirements for immigrants. 179 The Court determined that although
there was no express intent by Congress to preempt this area, the federal government
had historically played a unique role in international relations and regulating
immigration. 180 The Court concluded that such a unique role justified preemption of
the state’s requirements. 181

172. K.K. DuVivier, State Ballot Initiatives in the Federal Preemption Equation: A Medical
Marijuana Case Study, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 221, 255 (2005).
173. Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, 348 (1933).
174. Id. at 350.
175. Id.
176. DuVivier, supra note 172, at 258.
177. Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab’ys, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985); see also
Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996).
178. DuVivier, supra note 172, at 259.
179. 312 U.S. 52, 74 (1941).
180. Id. at 62.
181. Id. at 62-63.
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The Supreme Court has noted that certain situations warrant a more rigorous
application of the presumption against preemption. 182 In Geier v. American Honda
Motor Co., the Court held that the National Traffic and Motor Safety Act preempted
an injured motorist’s defective design claim under local tort law. 183 While the fivejustice majority did not apply the presumption against preemption, the dissenters
noted that preemption by federal agency actions as opposed to federal statutory law
raises “heightened federalism and nondelegation concerns” because agencies “are
not designed to represent the interests of States.” 184 This hesitancy to find preemption
from agency action was in line with the previous opinion of the Court, Hillsborough
County v. Automated Medical Labs, Inc., in which it stated it is “more reluctant to
infer pre-emption from the comprehensiveness of regulations than from the
comprehensiveness of statutes.” 185
The presumption against preemption requires courts to do more than
examine congressional intent—it requires adopting the view that, in an effort to
preserve the authority of the states, Congress intended to allow potentially
conflicting state law to coexist with federal law. 186 In its most rigorous form, the
presumption acts similarly to the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, in which the
court makes all efforts to decide a case on other grounds before resorting to a
constitutional analysis. 187 In the presumption context, courts would make all efforts
to reconcile the conflicting federal and state laws in such a way to avoid
preemption. 188 In the words of Justice Souter, the standard would require that “[i]f
the [federal] statute’s terms can be read sensibly not to have a pre-emptive effect, the
presumption controls and no pre-emption may be inferred.” 189 Despite the Court
often mentioning the presumption, it has failed to become widely adopted or to have
a broad impact. 190 This is likely an effect of courts inconsistently invoking the
presumption in applicable cases and lacking a uniform consensus on how to apply it
when they do. 191
The presumption against preemption has never been applied in the context
of wildlife and land management. However, wildlife management has long been
recognized as an area traditionally reserved to the states, making it a subject where
courts could apply the presumption. Furthermore, because many of these conflicts
involve actions by federal agencies—such as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in
Wyoming v. United States or the U.S. Forest Service in Hunt v. United States—courts
should be more reluctant to find state law preempted, as the Geier dissenters noted.
While the unavoidable implication of federally owned land or of interstate commerce
may lead courts to conclude similarly to the Hines court—that the federal
government plays a unique role in the matter and thus preemption is appropriate—
182.
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the nearly ubiquitous nature of saving clauses in federal land management statutes
should further evidence Congress’s intent to avoid preemption in this area.
B.

Judicial Deference to State Ballot Initiatives

State ballot initiatives were born out of a frustration with legislatures’
unresponsiveness to the people’s will. 192 These initiatives are a form of direct
democracy where citizens propose and directly vote on issues instead of voting on
representatives who then decide the issues. There are some downsides to this process.
For example, the cost of obtaining the requisite signatures to get a measure on the
ballot often restricts the process to large, well-financed groups. 193 Additionally, if
little information is exchanged about the initiative during the signature gathering
process, some otherwise unpopular measures could make it on the ballot while some
potentially popular ones could fall short. 194 Despite the drawbacks, Justice Kennedy
has stated that “the popular initiative is necessary to implement ‘the theory that all
power of government ultimately resides in the people.’” 195
The Supreme Court directly addressed the issue of ballot initiatives and
federal preemption in Gregory v. Ashcroft. 196 In that case, the Court upheld the
validity of a ballot initiative that added a mandatory retirement provision for state
court judges to the state’s constitution. 197 The provision was challenged by several
affected state court judges as violating the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967. 198 These judges argued that the mandatory retirement provision should be
preempted by the Act’s ban on firing an employee based solely on age. 199 The Court
rejected that argument and adopted what it called the “plain statement rule.” 200 This
rule requires that Congress, “in the language of the statute[,] . . . make its intention
clear and manifest if it intends to preempt the historic powers of the States.” 201 The
Court stressed the importance of this rule, stating that “Congressional interference
with this decision of the people of Missouri . . . would upset the usual constitutional
balance of federal and state powers. For this reason, it is incumbent upon the federal
courts to be certain of Congress’ intent before finding that federal law overrides this
balance.” 202

192. Joshua J. Bishop, Standing in for the State: Defending Ballot Initiatives in Federal Court
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Gregory marked the first case in fifty years where the Court reversed its
usual course of finding that federal authority trumps states’ rights. 203 In so doing, the
Court limited the usual reach of federal preemption and recognized federalism as a
restraint on federal power through its heightened deference for Missouri’s ballot
initiative. 204 While this decision returned a significant amount of power back to the
states, the plain statement rule falls short of the rigorous standard of the presumption
against preemption. The plain statement rule looks only to the text of the statute to
discern Congressional intent. This is compared to the presumption’s requirement to
adopt any sensible interpretation of the federal statute that avoids preemption, even
if the language of the statute seems clear. The presumption against preemption would
have the court looking beyond the text to the structure of the statute, or to extrinsic
aids like legislative history, to discern Congressional intent. Nevertheless, that the
Court has recognized the significance of state ballot initiatives and granted them a
heightened deference signals a willingness to analyze the preemption of state ballot
initiatives in future conflicts with a different standard than other preemption cases.
The Supreme Court is not the only court to address the preemption of ballot
initiatives. Historically, state courts have construed ballot initiatives liberally to
uphold the will of the voters and promote citizen’s rights. 205 These courts have
followed a standard that all “doubts . . . be resolved in favor of [upholding the
initiative].” 206 For example, in Gayle v. Hamm, the California Court of Appeals
dismissed a challenge brought against a California state ballot initiative. 207 In its
reasoning, the court quoted a prior case dealing with a similar challenge, stating that:
[s]ince under our theory of government all the power of
government resides in the people, the power of initiative is
commonly referred to as a ‘reserve’ power and it has long been
[the court’s] judicial policy to apply a liberal construction to this
power wherever it is challenged in order that the right not be
improperly annulled. 208
The court concluded that “[i]f doubts can reasonably be resolved in favor of the use
of this reserve power, courts will preserve it.” 209
The California Court of Appeal’s conclusion aligns with the rigorous
presumption against preemption standard proposed by Justice Souter, that if the
statute’s terms can be read sensibly to not have a preemptive affect, the presumption
controls and the state law must be upheld. Both state courts and the Supreme Court
203. DuVivier supra note 172, at 270, 272.
204. DuVivier, supra note 172, at 272.
205. DuVivier, supra note 172, at 269; See e.g., Wagner v. Sec’y of State, 663 A.2d 564 (Me. 1995)
(stating that Maine’s Constitutional provision allowing citizens to propose legislative enactments
“must be liberally construed to facilitate, rather than to handicap, the people’s exercise of their
sovereign power to legislate”); State ex rel. Hodges v. Taft, 591 N.E.2d 1186, 1189 (Ohio 1992)
(stating that citizens’ right to propose, adopt, or reject legislation by initiatives are not to be
restricted by any limitations unless explicit in the state constitution).
206. DuVivier, supra note 172, 269; Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of
Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 477 (Cal. 1976).
207. Gayle v. Hamm, 25 Cal.App.3d 250, 258 (1972).
208. Id. (quoting Mervynne v. Acker, 189 Cal.App.2d 558, 563 (1961).
209. Id.
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have shown a willingness to deviate from the usual preemption analysis for certain
state laws and grant them higher deference to avoid preemption. This deviation is
essential for the implementation of the heightened deferential standard that courts
should apply to conflicts arising out of Colorado’s Proposition 114 and other state’s
wildlife related propositions that may follow.
The tendency to give heightened deference to ballot initiatives may be
evidence that courts prefer to avoid entangling themselves in political matters. Or it
could be a recognition of or respect for the power of the democratic process, as
Justice Kennedy articulated. Whichever the reason, this sentiment was captured by
the court in Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, a Ninth Circuit decision
upholding a ballot initiative amendment to the California Constitution. 210 In its
reasoning, the court stated that “[a] system which permits one judge to block with
the stroke of a pen what 4,736,180 state residents voted to enact as law tests the
integrity of our constitutional democracy.” 211
C.

State Ballot Initiatives in Wildlife Management

State ballot initiatives are themselves nothing new in the context of wildlife
management. Voters have previously used the process as a means to protect wildlife,
usually by prohibiting hunting of certain species or limiting the methods of
hunting. 212 However, it wasn’t until the 1990s that the practice became common:
voters in Colorado passed a measure prohibiting the spring hunting of bears with bait
or dogs, in Arizona they voted to prohibit using types of leg-hold traps and snares on
public lands, in Alaska they voted to prohibit hunting wolves, foxes, lynx, and
wolverines on the same day that an individual flies, and both Oregon and Washington
voted to prohibit using dogs to hunt bears and cougars. 213
Banning the hunting of a species or a method of take is predominantly
directed at individuals, which differs from that of Proposition 114. Proposition 114
is directed at Colorado Parks and Wildlife. The distinction is important because
conflicts over other ballot initiatives would be, and have been, almost exclusively
between affected individuals or member groups and their state. For example, Citizens
for Responsible Wildlife v. State, which involved a challenge of Washington State’s
ban on hunting with dogs, was brought by a hunting group against the state. 214 Past
legal challenges to wildlife related state ballot initiatives have not undergone a
preemption analysis because these laws are usually narrow enough to not conflict
with federal authority. 215 Proposition 114, on the other hand, imposes a broad
mandate on CPW to create an entire management plan for a new species. This will
initiate resource management decisions state-wide, and most importantly, on federal
210. Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997).
211. Id. at 699.
212. Tyler Welch, Can Citizens Better Use the Ballot Initiative to Protect Wildlife?: The Case of the
Mountain Lion in the West, 25 COLO. NAT. RES, ENERGY & ENVT’L L. REV. 419, 423 (2014).
213. Id. at 424.
214. 103 P.3d 203 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
215. See National Audubon Society v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding a California voter
initiative banning the use of leg-hold traps on federal land directly conflicted with the FWS’s use
of leg-hold traps to eliminate predators of endangered species of birds in National Wildlife
Refuges and thus couldn’t stand).
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lands where the wolves will at least partially reside. 216 Broad decisions like
Proposition 114 are likely to cause conflicts with federal authority and raise
preemption issues.
D.

The State Ballot Initiative Deferential Standard

The standard that courts should apply when analyzing the potential
preemption of state ballot initiatives gives a heightened deference to the will of the
voters. Courts should rigorously apply the presumption against preemption and adopt
any reasonable interpretation of the conflicting federal authority that avoids
preempting the state ballot initiative, resolving any remaining ambiguity in favor of
the state. Application of this standard will often necessitate moving beyond the text
of the federal statute to consider other extrinsic factors, such as legislative history,
policy statements, or the structure of the statute. 217
Consideration of these extrinsic factors is critical because, as many state
wildlife directors identified in the AFWA Task Force Report, the federal resource
management statutes that most often conflict with states are written in a way that
creates ambiguity over the appropriate federal-state balance of authority. Where the
text of the statutes is not sufficiently clear, looking to extrinsic factors becomes
essential to determine Congress’s intent regarding preemption of state laws. Any
remaining ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the state to protect the will of the
voter.
A vast majority of federal wildlife management statutes contain saving
clauses, pointing to Congress’s intent to avoid preempting the states. Although the
text of these clauses should seemingly be sufficient for courts to avoid finding
conflicting state law preempted, most cases have not been so simple. If courts were
to apply this deferential standard in future conflicts between federal authority and
state ballot initiatives, then these saving clauses would become powerful tools for
demonstrating that Congress did not intend for states to be preempted or have their
authority over wildlife displaced.
Courts have, at times, given little weight to saving clauses, as seen in the
Tenth Circuit’s decision in Wyoming v. United States. 218 In deciding this case, the
Tenth Circuit began from the assumption that “the [National Wildlife Refuge System
Improvement Act (“NWRSIA”)] was not to supersede the State of Wyoming’s
historical police powers to manage wildlife on federal lands within its borders unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” 219 The saving clause from the
National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act reads:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting the authority,
jurisdiction, or responsibility of the several States to manage,
control, or regulate fish and resident wildlife under State law or
216. Colorado
Parks
and
Wildlife,
Wolves
in
Colorado
FAQ,
https://cpw.state.co.us/learn/Pages/Wolves-in-Colorado-FAQ.aspx (last visited April 16, 2021)
(stating that “[w]olves are habitat generalists . . . [a]s long as prey is available, wolves can use a
variety of areas”).
217. DuVivier, supra note 172, at 273.
218. 279 F.3d 1214, 1234 (10th Cir. 2002).
219. Id. at 1231 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
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regulations in any area within the System. Regulations permitting
hunting or fishing of fish and resident wildlife within the System
shall be, to the extent practicable, consistent with State fish and
wildlife laws, regulations, and management plans. 220
The court acknowledged the powerful language in this clause, specifically
the first sentence, stating that it supports the court’s assumption that “the State retains
the absolute right to manage wildlife on the [National Elk Refuge] free from federal
intervention.” 221 However, the court does not stop at the text of the saving clause,
despite its clarity, stating that “[s]uch an interpretation of the saving clause . . .
simply is not feasible in light of established rules of construction requiring [the court]
to consider the NWRSIA in its entirety, mindful of congressional purposes and
objectives.” 222 For this contention, the court cites no authority.
Next in its analysis, the Wyoming court looked to discern congressional
purposes and objectives. The court looked to a policy from the Department of the
Interior titled the Department of the Interior Fish and Wildlife Policy: State-Federal
Relationship, which stated that the policy “is intended to reaffirm the basic role of
the States in fish and resident wildlife management” and to clarify the
“Congressional policy of Federal-State cooperation . . . [and] to foster a ‘good
neighbor’ policy” between the states and the federal government. 223 This policy
statement also supported the court’s assumption that Wyoming should retain the
right to manage its wildlife.
The court next looked to the legislative history, which emphasized that the
FWS’s cooperation with the states shall only be “to the extent practicable.” 224 The
court stated that:
[t]he discussion of the saving clause in the Senate Report together
with the entire tone of the NWRSIA reveals that Congress was
solicitous of state sensibilities and simply did not wish to face the
Federal-State jurisdictional dilemma which the NWRSIA . . .
created. Instead, Congress left the courts to resolve jurisdictional
disputes on a case-by-case basis. 225
The court concluded that “[i]n the end, the proposition that the FWS lacks the power
to make a decision regarding the health of wildlife on the [National Elk Refuge]
when a State, for whatever reason, disagrees with that decision proves too much.” 226
Although the court claimed to have begun its analysis from the assumption
that the state should have the absolute right to manage the wildlife on the National
Elk Refuge, it went to great lengths to reach a far different conclusion. Ultimately,
the court used the legislative history to override the plain meaning of the text,
seemingly working backwards from the conclusion that the state could not override
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

16 U.S.C. § 668dd(m).
Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1231.
Id.
43 C.F.R. § 24.2
Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1231-32.
Id. at 1233.
Id.
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the FWS’s decision. The court was able to do so because once it moved away from
the text, it found no extrinsic factors weighing in the State’s favor. The saving
clause’s text favored Wyoming’s position, but the court interpreted the policy
statement, the legislative history, and the statute’s “tone” to favor the position of the
FWS.
State ballot initiatives could change the outcome in cases like Wyoming. If
the vaccination of the elk was instead being carried out in accordance with a state
ballot initiative, then the will of the voters and the heightened deference that comes
with it could have been a critical extrinsic factor weighing in the state’s favor. 227
Viewed under the state ballot initiative deferential standard, the question for the court
then would have been, is there a sensible reading of the statute that could avoid
preemption? In its opinion, the Wyoming court answers that question in the
affirmative by citing to an interpretation of the same saving clause from the D.C.
Circuit. 228
In the case Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, the D.C. Court of Appeals does
interpret the same saving clause in a way that reserves management authority to the
states. 229 In that case, the court was deciding whether the National Environmental
Policy Act obligated the Department of the Interior to prepare an environmental
impact statement before allowing Alaska to conduct a wolf hunt on federal lands as
part of a wildlife-management program. 230 In concluding that it does not, the court
walked through several environmental statutes and noted where, “[d]espite
[Congress’s] ability to take control into its own hands, Congress has traditionally
allotted the authority to manage wildlife to the states.” 231
One of these statutes relied on by the Andrus court was the NWRSIA, and
more specifically, the saving clause at issue in Wyoming. 232 The court stated that
with regard to the NWRSIA and its saving clause, “Congress has adhered to that
allocation” of leaving the authority to manage wildlife with the states. 233 If the
Wyoming court were implementing the deferential standard for state ballot
initiatives, then the Wyoming court’s sensible reading of the statute would have been
the same as the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of the same saving clause—that the state
retained jurisdiction over the wildlife, thus avoiding preemption.

227. A very similar question came before the Ninth Circuit in 2002 in Audubon Society v. Davis, 307
F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2002). There, the question was whether a California state ballot initiative that
banned the use of leg-hold traps on federal lands was preempted by several sources of federal
authority, including the NWRSIA. The court concluded that the law directly conflicted with the
FWS’s use of leg-hold traps to eliminate predators of endangered species of birds in National
Wildlife Refuges and thus was preempted. However, on appeal, the issue of preemption by the
NWRSIA was unchallenged. The court noted that “the state parties d[id] not discuss NWRSIA
preemption at all,” and therefore, without a thorough analysis, preemption was upheld.
228. See Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1231.
229. Id. (“But see Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (suggesting
without analysis in dicta that the first sentence of [the saving clause] reserves the authority to
manage wildlife on federal lands to the States”).
230. Andrus, 627 F.2d at 1239-40.
231. Id. at 1248-50.
232. Id. at 1248.
233. Id.
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Analyzing conflicts with this deferential standard in cases like Wyoming or
Gregory is relatively straightforward because those conflicts involved a single
federal statute, such as the NWRSIA or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
respectively. Predicting how this framework will apply to Colorado’s wolf
reintroduction effort is less certain.
Proposition 114’s requirements are relatively broad. Among determining
requirements for funding and compensation for livestock, CPW must, by December
31, 2023, develop a plan to restore and manage a population of gray wolves on lands
west of the Continental Divide. 234 CPW must also take action “necessary or
beneficial for establishing and maintaining a self-sustaining population.” 235
Unlike the situation in Gregory where the state initiative implemented a
narrow and specific law—that state judges of a certain age had to retire—Proposition
114 provides a significant amount of discretion to CPW. Courts could interpret the
“necessary or beneficial” action required by the proposition to extend the authority
from the ballot initiative to any discretionary actions taken by CPW. For the actions
where courts do extend this authority, under the deferential framework the courts
would be required to find a sensible reading of the statute that would avoid
preemption, thus finding in favor of the state more often than instances of ordinary
conflict preemption.
Nearly all the relevant federal land and wildlife related statutes that could
conflict with the state’s actions contain saving clauses that explicitly leave
management authority with the states. 236 For example, it has already been seen how
the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act—at issue in Wyoming v.
United States—could conflict with a state’s management actions. The U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service manages 95 million acres of land under this act, providing ample
opportunities for additional conflict. 237 The Bureau of Land Management manages
245 million acres of land and 700 million acres of mineral estate according to the
provisions of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 238 and another
106 million acres under the Wilderness Act, 239 both of which contain saving clauses
that reserve authority for the state. 240 These saving clauses provide the courts with a
sensible way to read these statutes that avoids preemption. Of course, some statutes
and sources of federal power, notably the ESA and the MBTA, are fairly absolute in
their authority and a state is likely never to prevail in conflicts with them.

234. COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-2-105.8 (2020).
235. Id.
236. See Robert L. Fischman, Angela M. King, Saving Clauses and Trends in Natural Resources
Federalism, 32 WM. & MARY EVT’L L. & POL’Y REV. 129, 147 (2007).
237. National Wildlife System Improvement Act, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
https://www.fws.gov/refuge/National_Elk_Refuge/what_we_do/1997Act.html (last visited Dec.
1, 2021).
238. 43 U.S.C. § 1701.
239. 16 U.S.C. § 1131.
240. BLM
&
FLPMA,
Public
Lands
Foundation
for
America’s
Heritage,
https://publicland.org/about/blm-flpma/ (last visited Dec 1, 2021). America’s Public Lands
Explained, U.S. Dept of the Interior, https://www.doi.gov/blog/americas-public-lands-explained
(last visited Dec. 1, 2021). Fischman, supra note 245, at 147.
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Drafting State Ballot Initiatives to Avoid Preemption

Even with the potential that wildlife management decisions made by ballot
initiative will allow states to prevail in conflicts with federal authority, there are steps
that drafters of state ballot initiatives can take to minimize the chance for conflict.
When comparing Colorado’s Proposition 114 to state ballot initiatives related to
other areas of the law, such as mandatory retirement ages or medical marijuana, a
notable difference is the number of federal statutes that have the potential to be at
issue. The fewer federal statutes to conflict with, the easier it would be for drafters
of ballot initiatives to predict conflicts and tailor their writing accordingly.
For example, in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation & Development Commission, a California statute imposing a
moratorium on the construction of nuclear power plants was challenged by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission as being preempted by the Atomic Energy Act. 241
The state law was passed by the legislature as a response to significant pressure from
voters. 242 The Court determined that, through the authority of the Atomic Energy
Act, “the Federal Government has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety
concerns.” 243 Therefore, any “state moratorium on nuclear construction grounded in
safety concerns falls squarely within the prohibited field.” 244 The drafters of the state
statute likely knew of this prohibition and made sure that their law was written to
avoid conflict and preemption. This level of specificity is possible in this context
because there is only one federal statute that governs the state’s ability to regulate
nuclear facility development.
In the wildlife management context, the relevant federal statutes would be
far less clear. The statute would be determined by several factors, including what
type of land the conflict arises on—Refuges, Wilderness, National Forest, etc.—and
whether the land or species is subject to special protections, like those under the ESA.
For example, if the ESA is in play, a species is likely to live on various types of
federally owned and managed land, even in the same state, meaning that several
federal land management statutes could be at issue at different times based on one
ballot initiative. The federal statutes at issue could also be predicted by looking at
which statutes have most often conflicted with state laws. The Association of Fish
and Wildlife Agencies Task Force Report gives insight into this from the perspective
of state agencies. Should other states imitate Colorado and pass a major wildlife
management statute by ballot initiative, the drafters should do their best to anticipate
where the most likely challenges to the new law will originate from. Colorado’s wolf
reintroduction effort could prove a useful test for these drafters to see where conflicts
actually arise.
CONCLUSION
After over a century of courts slowly eroding states’ power to manage their
wildlife, Proposition 114 and its method of initiating wildlife management via direct
241. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 194195 (1983).
242. DuVivier, supra note 172, at 265 n.254.
243. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 212.
244. Id. at 213.
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democracy represents a novel chance for states to regain some of the power they
have lost to the federal government. While Proposition 114 was created exclusively
by the voters, if this method proves successful, CPW or another state’s wildlife
agency could even take part in proposing or drafting a future ballot initiative. By
doing so, the initiative would benefit from the expertise of the state, while the state
would then benefit from having the backing of its voters. This could serve as a
powerful tool for states wanting to enact a major change to a wildlife related law or
to undertake a major wildlife related effort, such as the reintroduction of a species.
Proposition 114 may lead to the type of conflict that challenges the balance
of federal-state authority, and if it does, Colorado may see the first ruling granting it
new authority in the realm of wildlife management since the Supreme Court first
articulated the state ownership doctrine in Geer v. Connecticut. Even if this measure
itself does not lead to any such conflicts or changes in the balance of state and federal
power, other states may look to this example as a means of potentially strengthening
their standing against the federal government in future wildlife reintroduction or
management efforts.
By undertaking the wolf reintroduction effort with the backing of the voters,
any conflicts that arise between CPW and the federal government should be viewed
under the state ballot initiative deferential standard. While there is no precedent
mandating that such analysis take place, granting this heightened deference to uphold
a state ballot initiative is in line with the belief expressed by both state and federal
courts, several past Supreme Court Justices, and with the foundational principles of
the United States: that the will of the voters should reign supreme.

